Abstract-The issue of increasing volume, variety and velocity of has been an area of concern in cloud forensics. The high volume of data will, at some point, become computationally exhaustive to be fully extracted and analysed in a timely manner. To cut down the size of investigation, it is important for a digital forensic practitioner to possess a well-rounded knowledge about the most relevant data artefacts from the cloud product investigating. In this paper, we seek to tackle on the residual artefacts from the use of CloudMe cloud storage service. We demonstrate the types and locations of the artefacts relating to the installation, uninstallation, log-in, log-off, and file synchronisation activities from the computer desktop and mobile clients. Findings from this research will pave the way towards the development of data mining methods for cloud-enabled big data endpoint forensics investigation.
cloud hosting environment means the examiners may need to rely on the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) for preservation of evidence at a lower level of abstraction, and this may not often be viable due to service level agreements between a CSP and its consumers [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Even if the location of the data could be identified, traditional practices and approaches to computer forensics investigation are unlikely to be adequate [9] i.e., the existing digital forensic practices generally require a bit-by-bit copy of an entire storage media [15] [16] [17] which is unrealistic and perhaps computationally infeasible on a large-scale dataset [12] . It has been demonstrated that it could take more than 9 hours to merely acquire 30GB of data from an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud environment [18] , [19] hence, the time required to acquire a significantly larger dataset could be considerably longer. These challenges are compounded in cross-jurisdictional investigations which could prohibit the transfer of evidential data due to the lack of crossnation legislative agreements in place [7] , [20] [21] [22] . Therefore, it is unsurprising that forensic analysis of the cloud service endpoints remains an area of research interest [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] .
CloudMe (previously known as 'iCloud') is a Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud model currently owned and operated by Xcerion [30] . The CloudMe service is provided in a free version up to 19 GB (with referral program) and premium versions up to 500 GB storage for consumers and 5 TB for business users [31] . CloudMe users may share contents with each other as well as public users through email, textmessaging, Facebook and Google sharing. There are three (3) modes of sharing in CloudMe namely WebShare, WebShare+, and Collaborate. WebShare only permits one-way sharing where the recipients are not allowed to make changes to the shared folder. WebShare+ allows users to upload files/folders only, while collaborative sharing allows the recipients to add, edit or delete the content, even without the use of CloudMe client application [32] . The service can be accessed using the web User Interface (UI) as an Internet file system or the client applications, which are available for Microsoft Windows, Linux, Mac OSX, Android, iOS, Google TV, Samsung Smart TV, Western Digital TV, Windows Storage Servers, Novell's Dynamic File Services Suite, Novosoft Handy Backup etc. CloudMe is also compatible with third (3 rd ) path software and Internet services, enabling file compression, encryption, document viewing, video and music streaming etc. through the web/client applications [32] .
In this paper, we seek to identify, collect, preserve, and analyse residual artefacts of use CloudMe cloud storage service on a range of end-point devices. We focus on the What residual artefacts can be recovered from the hard drive and physical memory after a user has used the CloudMe web application? 3. What Cloudme residual artefacts remain on the internal memory, and the locations of the data remnants on an Android and iOS client device? The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the related work. Section III highlights the experiment environment setup. In Section IV, we discuss the traces from the storage media and physical memory dumps of the desktop clients. Section V presents the findings from mobile clients and network traffic, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper and outline potential future research areas in Section VI. [33] . The key aspects are to provide on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid edacity, and measured services. There are three cloud computing service models [33] , which are Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). NIST [33] also defined four deployment models as part of the cloud computing definition, which are public, private, community, and hybrid clouds. The public cloud is owned and operated by a provider organisation. Consumers can subscribe to the service for a fee, based on the storage or bandwidth usage. On the other hand, the private cloud is tailored to a single organisation's needs. The cloud infrastructure that is administered by organisations sharing common concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations) are called community cloud.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Cloud computing is not without its own unique forensics challenges. Challenges such as jurisdiction differences, loss of data control, physical inaccessibility of evidences, multitenancy, and lack of tools for large scale distributed and virtualized systems are often cited as main causes of concern for cloud forensics [34] [35] [36] [37] . Other pinpointed challenges include diverse digital media types, anonymity of IP addresses, decentralisation, and utilisation of anti-forensic and encryption techniques [36] , [38] , [39] . Fahdi et al. [40] found that the top three cloud forensic challenges according to digital forensic practitioners are volume of data, legal aspect, and time, while the top three challenges raised by digital forensic researchers are time, volume of data, and automation of forensic analysis.
Delving deeper into the legal challenges, Hooper et al. [20] reviewed the 2011 Australian Federal Government's Cybercrime Bill amendment on mutual legal assistance requests and concluded that laws amendment on a jurisdiction alone may not be adequate to address multi-jurisdiction investigation issues in cloud computing environments. Martini and Choo [7] , Taylor et at. [41] , and Daryabar et al. [10] also agree on the need for harmonious laws across jurisdictions. Simou et al. [36] and Pichan et al. [37] added that the issues of CSP dependence could exacerbate the challenges in all stages of cloud forensics (e.g., identify, preserve, analyse, and report [42] , [43] ). Consequently, Farina et al. [44] and Damshenas et al. [3] , [11] suggested that such concerns can be mitigated through clearly-defined Service Level Agreements (SLA) between service providers and consumers.
Martini and Choo [45] proposed the first cloud forensic investigation framework, which was derived based upon the frameworks of McKemmish [46] and NIST [43] . The framework was used to investigate ownCloud [47] , Amazon EC2 [18] , VMWare [48] , and XtreemFS [49] . Quick et al. [22] further extended and validated the four-stage framework using SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive, and ownCloud. Chung et al. [50] proposed a methodology for cloud investigation on Windows, Mac OSX, iOS, and Android devices. The methodology was then used to investigate Amazon S3, Google Docs, and Evernote. Scanlon et al. [51] outlined a methodology for remote acquisition of evidences from decentralised file synchronisation networks and utilised it to investigate BitTorrent Sync [52] . In another study, Teing et al. [53] proposed a methodology for investigating the newer BitTorrent Sync application (version 2.0) or any third party or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) applications. Do et al. [54] proposed an adversary model for digital forensics and demonstrated how such an adversary model can be used to investigate mobile devices (e.g. Android smartwatch -Do et al. [55] and apps). Ab Rahman et al. [56] , proposed a conceptual forensic-by-design framework to integrate forensics tools and best practices in development of cloud systems.
Marty [57] and Shields et al. [58] proposed a proactive application-level logging mechanism, designed to log information of forensics interest. However, Zawoad and Hasan [59] argued that the proposed solutions may not be viable in real world scenarios. Forensic researchers such as Dykstra and Sherman [60] , Gebhardt and Reiser [61] , Quick et al. [22] , and Martini and Choo [48] , on the other hand, presented methods and prototype implementations to support the (remote) collection of evidential materials using Application Programming Interfaces (API). Quick and Choo [62] and Teing et al. [25] studied the integrity of data downloaded from the web and desktop clients of Dropbox, Google Drive, Skydrive, and Symform and identified that the act of downloading files from client applications does not breach the evidence integrity (e.g., no change in the hash values), despite changes in file creation/modification time.
In addition to remote collection of evidences, scholars also studied the potential of on-device collection of cloud artefacts such as from Evernote [50] , Amazon S3 [50] , Dropbox [29] , [50] , Google Drive [27] , [50] , Microsoft Skydrive [28] , Amazon Cloud Drive [63] , BitTorrent Sync [64] , SugarSync [65] , Ubuntu One [26] , huBic [66] , Mega [67] , Syncany [24] as well as different mobile cloud apps [15] , [68] , [69] . Quick and Choo [27] [28] [29] also identified that data erasing tools such as Eraser and CCleaner could not completely remove the data remnants from Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft SkyDrive. From the literature, there is currently no work that focuses on forensic investigation of CloudMe SaaS cloud -a gap we aim to cover in this research.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We adopted the research methodology of Quick and Choo [27] [28] [29] and Teing et al. [25] , [53] , [70] in the design of our experiments. The first step of the experiment was to setup the test environments for the desktop and mobile clients. The former consisted of three Virtual Machines (VMs) with following configurations:
 Windows 8.1 Professional (Service Pack 1, 64-bit, build 9600) with 2GB RAM and 20GB hard drive.  Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS with 1GB RAM and 20GB hard disk.  Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 with 1GB RAM and 60GB hard drive. The VMs were hosted using VMware Fusion Professional version 7.0.0 (2103067) on a Macbook Pro running Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5, with a 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB of RAM. As explained by Quick and Choo [27] [28] [29] , using physical hardware to undertake setup, erasing, copying, and re-installing an application would have been an onerous exercise. The client mobile devices comprised a factory restored iPhone 4 running iOS 7.1.2 and an HTC One X running Android KitKat 4.4.4. The mobile devices were jailbroken/rooted with 'Pangu8 Version 1.1' and 'Odin3 Version 185' (respectively) to enable root access. The 3111 th email messages of the Berkeley Enron emai l dataset (downloaded from http://bailando.sims.berkeley.edu/e nron_email.html) were used to create a set of sample files which are saved in .RTF, .TXT, .DOCX, .JPG (print screen), .ZIP, and .PDF formats, providing dataset for this research experiment. Similar to previous studies [25] , [28] , [65] , [71] , we conducted a predefined set of experiments namely installation and uninstallation of the CloudMe client applications as well as uploading, downloading, viewing, deleting, unsyncing, sharing, and inactivating the sync files/folders to simulate various real world scenarios of using the CloudMe desktop and mobile client applications as well as web application using the Google Chrome client for Windows version 51.0.2704.103m. Before each experiment, we made a base snapshot of each VM workstation to serve as a control case. After each experiment, we created a snapshot of the VM workstations and took a bit-stream (dd) image of the virtual memory (.VMEM file) and a forensic copy of the virtual disk (.VMDK file) of the latter in Encase Evidence (E01) format. The decision to instantiate the physical memory dumps and hard disks with the virtual disk and memory files was taken to prevent the datasets from being modified because of using memory/image acquisition tools [27] [28] [29] . As for the mobile clients, we made binary images using 'dd' over SSH/ADB Shell.
In addition, we set up a forensic workstation with the tools in Table I Deleting the sync folders with the option "When delete folder in the cloud and all its content is selected." in the client applications, we observed that the sync folders remained locally but were removed completely from the server. In all scenarios, the data and download directories remained after the uninstallation of the client applications.
A. Cache.db Database
The file synchronisation metadata and cloud transaction records could be predominantly located in the /%CloudMe%/cache.db database (in the data directory). The tables of forensic interest are 'user_table', 'syncfolder_table', 'syncfolder_folder_table', and 'syncfolder_document_table'. The 'user_table' holds the property information of users which logged in from the desktop clients; 'syncfolder_table' maintains a list of metadata associated with the sync folder(s) added by or download to the local device; 'syncfolder_folder_table' keeps track of the tree structure for the sync folder(s); 'syncfolder_document_table' records the metadata associated with the synced files in the sync folder(s). Details of the table columns of forensic interest are presented in Table II . To examine the contents of Apple Property List (PLIST) files. Fig. 1 . shows the SQL query used to parse Cache.db and produce synchronization history shown in Fig. 2 . Examination of the Windows registry revealed the username for the currently logged in user and the device name in HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\startup\me and HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\<Userna me>\_xClientId (respectively). The username can be a useful identifying information for the cache.db database's remnants i.e., locating copies of the 'user_table' data in physical memory dumps. The client ID is a unique 32-character alphanumeric string used to identify a CloudMe device, which can be used to correlate residual evidences.
In Ubuntu client both username and clientID were detected at /home/<User Profile>/.config/CloudMe/Sync.conf file, by looking at values for entries 'me' (of the 'startup' property) and '_xClientId' (of the 'Username' property) respectively. In the Mac OSX client, Username and ClientID were detected in the 'startup.me' and ' [Username] .xClientId' properties of the /Users/<User Profile>/Library/Preferences/com.CloudMe.Sync.plist file.
B. Cloudme Log Files
Log files play a vital role in an incident investigation [13] 
C. Web Browser Artefacts
Web browsing activities history is a critical source of evidence [25] , [27] [28] [29] , [47] . Rebuilding the web browsing caches produced the root directory for the web application at www.cloudme.com/v1. In particular, within the /%v1%/folders directory we recovered a list of metadata files for the sync folders accessed by the user, which could be differentiated by the folder ID. Fig. 3 illustrates the metadata information associated with the sync folders; each of which creates a 'folder' subtag to house the folder ID and name, and a 'tag' subtag to hold the folder sharing information such as the webshare ID and folder sharing type i.e., in the 'group' property.
A search for the filenames of the sample files recovered files viewed on the web application in cache at Fig. 4 shows that the device name and client ID can be detected from the 'dName' and 'clientId' properties of the 'sync' tag in the metadata file. Each sync folder creates a 'syncfolder' subtag to define the folder name, directory path, folder ID, last sync time, and information about whether the sync folder has been synchronised and if it is a favourite folder in the 'name', path', 'folderId,' lastSync', 'hasSynchronized', and 'favoriteFolder' properties respectively.
Another directory of interest within the 'v1' directory is the user-specific %v1%\users\<User ID> directory, which maintains a list of OpenSearch [72] description documents containing a wealth of folder metadata of forensic interest about the sync folders [73] . For example, the %v1%/users/<User ID>/favorites/exte nded=true&order=favoritename&count=1000&offset=0&_= 1458191.xml document holds the OpenSearch description for the favourite folders. The metadata of interest recovered from this document include the folder IDs, folder names, folder sharing passwords, webshare IDs, as well as usernames and user IDs for the favourite folders in the 'folder_id', 'name', 'password', 'webShareId', sharingUserId', 'sharingUserName' properties of the sync folder/file-specific 'favorite' subtags (see Fig.  5 ). The %v1%/users/<User ID>/webshares/order=name&desc=false &count=1000&offset=0&resources=true&_=145.xml docum ent defines the OpenSearch property of the shared folders/files, such as the update time, creation time, passwords, creators' IDs, webshare IDs in the 'updated', created', 'password', 'userId', and 'id' properties of the sync folder/file-specific 'webshare' subtags. The folder name and ID could be discerned from the 'name' and 'id' properties of the 'folder' subtag (see Fig. 6 ). Further details of the folder/file sharing could be located in the %v1%/users/<User ID>/lifestream document, such as the senders' user ID, senders' group ID, senders' username, receivers' user ID, receivers' group ID, receiver's username, favourite IDs (for favourite folders), and whether the sharing has been seen in the 'senderId', 'senderGroupId', 'senderName', 'receiverId', 'receiverGroupId', 'receiverName', 'parentFolder', and 'seen' properties in the 'event' subtags.
D. Physical Memory Analysis
For all investigated client applications, analysis of the physical memory dumps using the 'pslist' function of Volatility recovered the process name, process identifier (PID), parent process identifiers (PPID) as well as process initiation time. We determined that the CloudMe process could be differentiated using the process names 'CloudMe.exe', 'cloudme-sync' and 'CloudMe' on the Windows, Ubuntu and Mac OS clients respectively.
Undertaking data carving of the memory image of the CloudMe process determined that the files of forensic interest such as cache.db, sync.config, and CloudMe logs can be recovered. When CloudMe was accessed using the web client, we could recover copies of the OpenSearch description documents containing the folder sharing passwords from the web browser's memory space intact. Unsurprisingly, we also managed to recover copies of the database, configuration, and log files in plain text. For the cache database, a search for the username for the user could locate the data [74] of the 'user_table', which holds the user ID in the row ID variant field of the cell header section [74] in hex format. Once the user ID is identified, a practitioner may locate the file offsets contained between the cell data section of the 'syncfolder_document_table', 'syncfolder_folder_table' and 'syncfolder_table' tables, and work backwards to read the header field type variants [74] to recover the remaining data fields.
V. CLOUDME ANALYSIS ON In this paper, we examined the client residual artefacts left by CloudMe SaaS cloud as a backbone for big data storage. Our research included installing the client applications as well as uploading, downloading, deleting, sharing and activating/inactivating the sync folders/files using the client and web applications. We determined that a forensic practitioner investigating CloudMe cloud application should pay attention to the cache database, web caches, as well as log and configuration files as highlighted in TABLE IV. Unlike cloud applications such as Symform [25] and BitTorrent Sync [23] , the CloudMe client applications did not create any identifying information (e.g., configuration file and cache folder) in the sync folders, and hence a practitioner cannot identify the sync directories from the directory listing. This also indicates that the cache database is critical source of evidence for the synchronisation metadata and cloud transaction records, and hence should not be overlooked. Analysis of the mobile clients determined that the findings were not as conclusive in comparison with the desktop clients, and only the viewed files could be recovered. This indicated that the iOS and Android mobile clients are merely a UI for the web application. Our examination of the web browsing activities identified unique URLs that can aid in identification of the user actions made to the web application, such as login, logout, and accessing and downloading sync files/folders. Although the application layer was fully encrypted i.e., with the deployment of HTTPS, we were able to recover the root directory for the web application from the web browser's caches unencrypted, which included viewed files and metadata files and OpenSearch documents for the sync files/folders that contain the timestamp information and sharing passwords for the sync folders/files. However, a practitioner should note that the availability of the cached items depends on the API requests made to the web application and hence the artefacts may not be consistent across different occasions.
Our analysis of the physical memory captures revealed that the memory dumps may provide potential for alternative methods for recovering applications cache, logs, configuration files and other files of forensic interest. It was also possible to recover the folder sharing password from the web cache in plain text, but not for the login password. This suggested that a practitioner can only obtain the login password from the mobile clients, using WebBrowserPassView when manually saved in the web browsers, through an offline brute-force technique, or directly from the user. Nevertheless, a practitioner must keep in mind that memory changes frequently according to user activities and will be wiped as soon as the system is shut down. Hence, obtaining the memory snapshot of a compromised system as quickly as possible increases the likelihood of obtaining the encryption key before it is overwritten in memory.
Future work would include extending this study to cloud storage services to have an up-to-date understanding of the big data artefacts from different cloud deployment models, which could lay the foundation for the development of data reduction techniques (e.g., data mining and intelligence analysis) for these technologies [2] , [4] , [75] , [76] . 
